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screening of donors89 would support an action based on negligence, or
possibly a criminal offense.
One must admit that by the application of strict liability, those
who contract post-transfusion hepatitis will be insured against such
injury. However, the hospital will not bear the risk of such injury;
but rather, those who seek medical service will bear the responsibility
for the risk of loss. Liability insurance will surely rise and hospital costs
will simultaneously increase. Those increases will be borne by the
public, not by the hospital.
The simplistic solution of Cunningham will seem most appealing
to other courts throughout the land. Nonetheless, the detrimental
consequences to the medical world and the public which it serves
will far outweigh the advantages bestowed on the inflicted patient.
Jerry G. DuTerroil

CRIMINAL LAW-FELONY MURDER-VICARIOUS LIABILITY-A FELON
CAN BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR A MURDER COMMITTED BY A FEARMOTIVATED VICTIM-RESPONSIBILITY

Is

BASED

ON A

THEORY OF

VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND NOT FELONY-MURDER. Taylor v. Superior
Court of Alameda County, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (Cal. 1970).
On the evening of January 12, 1969, James Daniels and John Smith
attempted to rob Jax Liquor Store. The store was operated by Mrs.
Linda Lee West and her husband, Jack. During the robbery, "Daniels
repeatedly referred to the fact that he and Smith were armed. According to Mrs. West, Daniels 'chattered insanely' during this time,
telling Mr. West . . . 'put the money in the bag. Don't move or I'll
blow your head off. He's got a gun. He's got a gun. Don't move or we'll
have an execution right here. Get down on the floor, I said on your
stomach, on your stomach.' Throughout this period, Smith's gun was
pointed at Mr. West."'
While Daniels was forcing Mr. West to the floor, Mrs. West drew a
pistol from under her clothing and fired at Smith, who was struck on
the right side of the chest. Mrs. West fired four more shots in rapid
succession with Smith returning the fire. During this period, Mr. West
had seized a pistol and fired two shots at Smith. Mrs. West's last shot
was fired at the fleeing Daniels. Smith died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds and Daniels was wounded.
Petitioner Taylor, driver of the get-away car, and his co-defendant,
89 14 AM. JUR. PROOF Or FAcrs § 23 Hepatitis 149-50 (1964).

'Taylor v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275, 276 (Cal. 1970'
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Daniels, were charged by information with the murder of John H.
Smith. The Superior Court denied petitioner's motion to set aside the
information as to the murder count. The supreme court issued an
alternative writ of prohibition. Held-Alternative writ discharged,
peremptory writ denied. A felon can be held responsible for a murder
committed by a fear-motivated victim. Responsibility is based on a
theory of vicarious liability and not felony-murder.
Under the common law felony-murder rule, if a person killed another while committing or attempting to commit a felonious act, the
killing was murder. 2 The malice necessary to make the killing murder
is transferred from the underlying felony to the homicide. 3 A generally
accepted explanation of the origin of the doctrine is that at early common law practically all felonies were punishable by death. Therefore
it was considered immaterial whether the condemned was hanged for
the initial felony or for the death accidentally resulting from the
felony. 4 This is no longer true, for today, most felonies are not punishable by death. As a result of these penal reforms, all jurisdictions
passed felony-murder statutes which in effect provide that a killing
committed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of robbery, arson, or other inherently dangerous felonies is murder. 5 The
statutes were known as felony-murder statutes because the felonymurder rule was invoked to impute malice to a killing.
Originally the felony-murder rule was applied under the agency
theory.
No person can be held responsible for a homicide unless the act
was either actually or constructively committed by him. And in
order to be his act it must be committed by his hand, or by someone acting in concert
with him, or in furtherance of a common
6
design or purpose.
The courts were reluctant to venture beyond limiting the application
7
of the agency theory to homicides committed by a felon or his co-felon.
2 Commonwealth v. Guida, 19 A.2d 98, 100 (Pa. 1941).

8 Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 475 (Pa. 1958).
4 Id. at 476.
5 E.g., PENN. STATUTEs ANN. Title 18, § 4701 (Purdon 1963). "All murder which .

shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempting to perpetrate any arson . . . robbery . . . . shall be murder in the first degree." TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 42 (1952):
"One intending to commit a felony and who in the act of preparing for or executing the
same shall through mistake or accident do another act which if voluntarily done, would be
a felony, shall receive the punishment affixed to the felony actually committed."
6 Butler v. People, 18 N.E. 338, 339 (Ill. 1888).
7 See Note, Proximate Cause and the Extension of the Felony-Murder Rule, 38 S. CAL.
L. Rav. 698, 700 n. 17, 18, 19, 22 (1965). See also, Homicide-Liability of Robber for Death
Caused by Shot of Third Person [Arkansas], 25 J. CIuM. L.C. 283 (1934). The shield or
alternate danger cases are a long recognized exception to the agency theory of liability and
will not be discussed in this note. In such a case malice need not be implied or imputed.
Malice is express.
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The theory was followed throughout the United States until 19478
when the felony-murder rule was extended to impose criminal responsibility to a felon for a killing committed by a third party. In 1947, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Moyer,9 adopted
a vastly expanded rule of responsibility. In Moyer a gas station owner
was shot and killed during an attempted robbery. The issue arose
whether the bullet was shot by one of the felons or by a station employee; the court concluded it was immaterial and the felons were
convicted of first degree murder. The court adopted a second theory,
proximate cause:
Every robber or burglar knows that a likely later act in the chain
of events he inaugurates will be the use of deadly force against
him on the part of the selected victim. For whatever results follow
from the natural and legal use of retaliatory force, the felon must
be held responsible. 10
The court reasoned that as long as the felon was committing an offense
enumerated in the felony-murder statute, the malice necessary to make
the killing murder was imputed to the felon regardless of who did
the actual killing. While a majority of the states refused to accept
this reasoning and hold fast to the agency theory, some leading jurisdictions, including California, did adopt the proximate cause theory-"
A felon could now be held criminally responsible for a killing committed by his victim or by any nonparticipant to the felony where his
"felonious act is the proximate cause of another's death."' 2 Presently,
the theory of proximate cause, "an unwarranted judicial extension of
the felony-murder rule,' 3 has been repudiated in Pennsylvania,' 4
8 Note, CriminalLaw-Killing of Felon by Police Officer During Perpetrationof Robbery
Does Not Make Co-felon Criminally Responsible Under Pennsylvania Felony-Murder Rule,
106 U. PA. L. REV. 1176, 1177 (1958).
953 A.2d 736 (Pa. 1947).

Old. at 742.
11 People v. Harrison, I Cal. Rptr. 414 (Cal. App. 1959); People v. Wilburn, 314 P.2d
590 (Cal. App. 1957); Hornbeck v. State, 77 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1955); People v. Podolski, 52
N.W.2d 201 (Mich. 1952). See also, Note, Criminal Law-Under the Felony-Murder Doctrine, Felons Are Guilty of First Degree Murder of An Accomplice Who Is Killed By The
Victim of The Felony, 44 GEo. L.J. 529 (1956); Comment, Homicide-Felony--Murder
Doctrine-Shooting of Co-Felon by Victim of Armed Robbery, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 357
(1957); Morris, The Felon's Responsibility For The Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA. L.
REv. 50 (1956).
12 Commonwealth v. Almeida, 68 A.2d 595, 599 (Pa. 1949), 12 A.L.R.2d 183, 188 (1950).
See Note, Criminal Law-Murder-Felony-MurderDoctrine-Chargeto Jury, 1 CATH. U.
L. REV. 46 (1950).
18 Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 482 (Pa. 1958).
14 Commonwealth Smith v. Myers, 261 A.2d 550, 561 (Pa. 1970). "... none of the co-felons
is guilty of murder-if the fatal shot was fired by the holdup victim or by a policeman or
other law enforcement officer, or by a person attempting to prevent the robbery or the
robber's (or felon's) escape, or by anyone except one of the robbers or a co-felon." (emphasis added). See also Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472 (Pa. 1958) and People v.
Austin, 120 N.W.2d 766 (Mich. 1963).
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New York, 15 and California.' 6

In People v. Washington, the California court rejected the theory
of proximate cause. Washington's co-felon entered an office and pointed
his gun at the station owner who was seated at his desk; the station
owner drew a gun from the desk and shot and killed the co-felon. The
court applied the agency theory and stated that before a felon can be
guilty under the felony-murder rule the act must be committed by
his own hands or by someone acting in concert with him; a felon is not
guilty where the killing is committed by one not a participant in the
felony. 17 Unsatisfied with this state of affairs, the court then adopted
the theory of vicarious liability. 18
In essence the theory consists of several elements applied together
to formulate criminal responsibility. The theory propounds that, if
during a felony, a felon or co-felon commits acts which imply malice
and a third party (policeman, victim, etc.) kills in a reasonable response
to those acts, the felon and his co-felon are criminally responsible and
can be convicted of first degree murder. Responsibility for such a murder is applied under basic rules defining principals and criminal conspiracies.
The general rule is well settled that, where several parties conspire
or combine together to commit any unlawful act, each is criminally responsible for the acts of his associates or confederates
committed in furtherance of any prosecution of the common design for which they combine. 19
Under vicarious liability, malice is implied when a "defendant for a
base, anti-social motive and with wanton disregard for human life, does
an act that involves a high degree of probability that it will result in
death. '

20

21
The theory transfers the implied malice from a felon's acts

15 People v. Wood, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328, 332 (N.Y. 1960); "In order for a felon to be guilty
of the homicide, the act (as in agency) must be 'either actually or constructively his, and
it cannot be his act in either sense unless committed by his own hand or by someone
acting in concert with him or in furtherance of a common object or purpose.'" See also
Note, Criminal Law-The Felony-Murder Doctrine and Its Limits, 19 ARK. L. REv. 180
(1965); Note, Criminal Law-Construction of New Yosk Felony-Murder Statute-Rejection
of Proximate Cause Theory-People v. Wood (New York 1960), 25 ALB. L. REv. 153 (1961).
16 People v. Washington, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446 (Cal. 1965): ". . . for a defendant to be
guilty of murder under the felony-murder rule the act of killing must be committed by
the defendant or by his accomplice acting in furtherance of their common design."
17 Id. at 446. See Commonwealth v. Almeida, 68 A.2d 595, 617 (Pa. 1949).
18

Id. at 445.

19 People v. Kauffman, 92 P. 861, 862 (Cal. 1907).
20 People v. Thomas, 261 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1953).
21 Taylor v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275, 280 n.1 (Cal. 1970).
"It is significant that People v. Thomas (concurring opinion) cited in Washington as a
case enunciating the implied malice doctrine . . . and the other cases enunciating this
doctrine involved defendants who recklessly and with conscious disregard of human life
had fired a gun or struck a blow with a deadly weapon directly at the victim or a group
of which the victim was a member." (Citations omitted).
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and holds him criminally responsible for the results of these acts under
the rules defining principals and criminal conspiracies. 22. The central
inquiry is "whether the conduct of a defendant or his accomplice was
sufficiently provocative of lethal resistance to support a finding of implied malice.

' 23

In Washington the court concluded that merely pointing a gun at a
victim who then shoots and kills, without further provocation, is not
sufficient to imply malice. In order to be convicted on a theory of
vicarious liability, a robber must commit malicious acts, in addition to
the acts constituting the underlying felony, which are sufficient to imply malice.24 In People v. Gilbert, the supreme court held malice may
be established where a defendant initiates a gun battle and that under
such circumstances he may be convicted of murder for a killing committed by another.25 In People v. Reed, a defendant resisted an officer's
commands and pointed his gun toward the police officers. The court
found "such aggressive actions required immediate reaction unless an
officer is to be held to the unreasonable requirement that an armed
robber be given the courtesy of the first shot. ' 26 In Brooks v. Superior
Court of the County of Los Angeles, the court stated reaching for and
grasping the officer's shotgun "was fraught with grave and inherent
27
danger to human life" and sufficient to raise an inference of malice.
In the instant case, Taylor v. Superior Court of Alameda County,
the supreme court stated that the holding of the proprietor at gunpoint, nervous apprehension and repeated threats of execution is conduct "sufficiently provocative of lethal resistance to lead a man of
ordinary caution and prudence to conclude that Daniels and Smith
'initiated' the gun battle, or that such conduct was done with conscious
disregard for life and with natural consequences dangerous to life."2 8
22 People v. Gilbert, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909, 918 (Cal. 1965): Once murder is established under
Section 187 and 188 "Section 189 may be invoked to determine its degree." In summary
the theory reasons:
(a) CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 187 (Deering Supp. 1971):
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.
(b) CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 188 (Deering 1960):
malice may be express or implied. . . . It is implied, when no considerable
provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an
abandoned and malignant heart.
(C) CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 189 (Deering 1960):
All murder . . . which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate
arson, rape, robbery . . . is murder of the first degree.
Criminal responsibility is placed upon the felons for a killing committed by a third party
under the rules defining principals and criminal conspiracies.
23 Taylor v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275, 278 (Cal. 1970).
24 People v. Washington, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (Cal. 1965).
2547 Cal. Rptr. 909 (Cal. 1965).
26 75 Cal. Rptr. 430, 435 (Cal. App. 1969).
27 48 Cal. Rptr. 762, 763 (Cal. App. 1966).
2891 Cal. Rptr. 275, 279 (Cal. 1970) (emphasis added).
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The majority holds "apart from the felony-murder doctrine, petitioner
could be found guilty of murder on a theory of vicarious liability." 29
In this 4-3 decision Justice Peters in his dissent stated:
To convert such acts-i.e. to convert a first degree robbery-into
murder solely because the victim killed one of the robbers is in
effect to reinstate the felony-murder doctrine in such a situation
contrary to the basic Washington holding that a defendant cannot
be convicted of murder simply because he and his accomplice committed a felony in which a death resulted.... The majority have
set forth a new wholly irrational, rule: if robbers point guns at
their victims without articulating the obvious threat inherent in
such action they cannot be convicted of murder for a killing committed by their victims, whereas if they articulate their threat they
can be convinced [sic] of murder in the same situation .... The
majority's30 purported distinction of Washington makes absolutely
no sense.
* While the majority and dissent ponder the question of overt conduct
sufficient to imply malice, both do agree with the theory of vicarious
liability adopted in People v. Washington."' The entire court concludes the rules defining principals and criminal conspiracies can be
invoked to hold a felon criminally responsible for a killing committed
by a third party. This holding is an expansion of those rules designed
and interpreted to impose liability on all conspirators only where the
act of killing is committed by one of the conspirators.The law is well
settled:
[A] party associated with others for the purpose of engaging in a
robbery, in which a homicide is committed by one of his associates,
is as guilty of murder as if he had actually done the killing him82
self ....
Generally these rules do not apply to killings committed by a third
party in response to a felon's acts, no matter how provocative of lethal
resistance these acts may be. Jurisdictions which followed the agency
theory have refused to hold a felon responsible for killings committed
by a third party; "the act (as in agency) must be 'either actually or
constructively his, and cannot be his act in either sense unless committed by his own hand or by someone acting in concert with him or
in furtherance of a common object or purpose.' ,,33 The California
29 Id. at 277.

3o Id. at 283.
44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (Cal. 1965).
32 People v. Lawrence, 76 P. 893, 897 (Cal. 1904). Compare Note, Criminal Law:
Conspiracy, Homicide committed by conspirator during escape after robbery. Liability
-of a co-conspirator-In State v. Terrell, Franklin, and Conner, 144 So. 488 (La. 1932), 18
CORNELL L. REv. 439 (1932).
33 People v. Wood, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328, 332 (N.Y. 1960). See Commonwealth v. Campbell,
* 3'
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Supreme Court has traditionally applied the rules defining principals
and criminal conspiracies to impose liability on all conspirators only
where a felon or co-felon commits the act of killing.3 4 In decisions discussing vicarious liability, the cases cited as precedent are not in point
and fail to add any support to the court's interpretation of the rules
defining principals and criminal conspiracies.3 5 This basic rule of
agency has been followed for over 100 years and absent the proximate
cause theory there is not the slightest suggestion of a different application of these rules. Vicarious liability is unique to California. In 1959,
the California court of appeals admitted "We have not been cited to,
nor have we found a California case which deals squarely with the
the question of criminal liability for a harm occurring in the commission, or attempt to commit, a felony where the fatal injury is inflicted by one not a participant in the felony. ' '3 6 The court failed to
mention a theory of vicarious liability and was content with a murder
conviction under the proximate cause theory.
California in a bold effort to impose criminal liability on the felon
has extended their rules defining principals and criminal conspiracies
beyond recognition. In addition, to make their new theory workable
89 Mass. 541 (1863); Butler v. People, 18 N.E. 338 (Il1. 1888); People v. Garippo, 127 N.E.
75 (Ill. 1920); Commonwealth v. Moore, 88 S.W. 1085 (Ky. 1905); State v. Oxendine, 122
S.E. 568 (N.C. 1924); People v. Austin, 120 N.W.2d 766 (Mich. 1963); Commonwealth v.
Balliro, 209 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1965), 14 A.L.R.3d 640 (1967).
34 People v. Olsen, 22 P. 125 (Cal. 1889); People v. Lawrence, 76 P. 893 (Cal. 1904);
People v. Raber, 143 P. 317 (Cal. 1914); People v. Reid, 225 P. 859 (Cal. 1924); People v.
Perry, 234 P. 890 (Cal. 1925); People v. Green, 17 P.2d 730 (Cal. 1932); People v. Ketchel, 30
Cal. Rptr. 538 (Cal. 1963). But cf. People v. Cabaltero, 87 P.2d 364, 368 (Cal. App. 1939).
Suggests a felon is not responsible where the fatal shot is fired by a third person.
35 See:

(a) In People v. Washington, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445 (Cal. 1965) the court cited as
precedent People v. Boss, 290 P. 881 (Cal. 1930) and People v. Kauffman, 92 P. 861
(Cal. 1907). Both are cases in which the felon committed the killing. The court also
cited Wilson v. State, 68 S.W.2d 100 (Ark. 1934) and Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim.
564, 55 S.W. 961 (1900). These are cases recognized as exceptions to the agency
theory. In the so-called shield cases malice is express.
(b) In People v. Gilbert, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909, 918 (Cal. 1965) the court cited two additional cases: People v. Schader, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193 (Cal. 1965) in which the killing
was committed by a felon and People v. Ferlin, 265 P. 230 (Cal. 1928). In Ferlin
an arsonist accidentally burned himself to death and the court concluded this coconspirator could not be convicted of his murder. To support its decision the court
cited People v. Garippo, 127 N.E. 75 (Ill. 1920) a case which directly contradicts the
court's present application of agency rules.
(c) In People v. Reed, 75 Cal. Rptr. 430, 435 (Cal. App. 1969); Brooks v. Superior Court
of the County of Los Angeles, 48 Cal. Rptr. 762, 764 (Cal. 1966) and Taylor v.
Superior Court of Alameda County, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275, 277 (Cal. 1970) no additional
cases were cited as precedent.
In the effort to find precedent in support of its theory of liability for a killing committed by one not a participant to the felony, the court cited cases during a period in
which there were admittedly no California cases in point. See People v. Wilburn, 314
P.2d 590, 593 (Cal. App. 1957) and People v, Harrison, I Cal. Rptr. 414, 416 (Cal. App.
1959). It is interesting that while the court refers to the rules defining principals and
criminal conspiracies and bases the entire theory of vicarious liability on these rules,
it fails to define these rules in either Washington, Gilbert, Reed, Brooks, or Taylor.
36 People v. Harrison, 1 Cal. Rptr. 414, 416 (Cal. App. 1959).
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the long recognized and intended meaning of Section 189 has been
completely changed. "Section 189 requires that the felon or his accomplice commit the killing, for if he does not, the killing is not committed to perpetrate the felony. ' 37 In order to justify a conviction for
first degree murder under the theory of vicarious liability, the court
has taken two unprecedented steps. First the court, without any precedent, applies basic agency rules in a totally unique manner to impose
criminal responsibility on a felon for a killing committed by a third
party. Malice aforethought cannot be ascribed to a felon for a killing
committed by a third party. A felon can be held responsible for a
killing with malice aforethought only where a felon or co-felon kills,
for "the thing which is imputed to a felon for a killing incidental to
his felony is malice and not the act of killing."3 Secondly, through
judicial interpretation the court alters the meaning of a statute which
clearly states "All murder . . . which is committed in the perpetration . . . of robbery . . . is murder of the first degree." 3 9 Section 189

was designed to impose criminal responsibility under the agency theory
on all felons for a killing committed by a felon during a robbery. The
statute was not designed to apply in a situation where a third party
commits a killing to thwart a felony. The court interprets Section 189
as though it clearly states any killing which results during a robbery
is first degree murder. The instant problem is one that can and must be
solved by the legislature, not by unwarranted extensions and interpretations of rules and statutes by the judiciary.40 "The only constitutional power competent to define crimes and prescribe punishment
therefor is the legislature, and courts do well to leave the promulgation of police regulations to the people's chosen legislative representa4
tives." 1
People v. Washington. 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445 (Cal. 1965).
Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 476 (Pa. 1958). Cf. People v. Washington, 44
Cal. Rptr. 442 (Cal. 1965).
39 CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 189 (Deering 1960).
40 N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A: 113-1, N.J.S.A. "If any person, in committing or attempting to
commit robbery . . . or any unlawful act against the peace of the state, of which the
probable consequences may be bloodshed, kills another, or if the death of anyone ensues
from the committing or attempting to commit any such crime or act.. " In State v.
Kress, 255 A.2d 481, 487 (N.J. 1969) the italicized portion of the above statute was found
sufficient to charge a felon with first degree murder where a police officer killed a bank
teller in an effort to prevent an escape of felons. See TEXAS PENAL CODE, A Proposed
Revision, art. 19.02 (1970):
An individual or corporation commits murder if:
(3) he commits or attempts to commit a felony . . . and in the course of and in
37
38

the furtherance of the felony, or in immediate flight from the commission or attempt,
he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes
the death of another .... (emphasis added).
The italicized portion of this proposed statute would seem to be applicable and sufficient for a conviction in the instant case.
41 Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 473 (Pa. 1958). See also Note, Criminal
Law: Applicability of Felony-Murder Rule Where Bystander Killed By a Person Other
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